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A theme of many of the papers is that we need to distinguish the
notion of intertemporal equity on the one hand and intertemporal
efficiency on the other hand. Intertemporal equity refers to the degree
to which the current generation should weight the interests of future
generations. Intertemporal egalitarianism, for example, holds that the
interests of a person living in the future should receive the same
weight as the interests of a person living today. Intertemporal effi-
ciency refers to the means by which the current generation should
implement the obligations imposed by intertemporal equity. The two
distinct ideas are frequently confused in the legal literature; the confu-
sion is embodied by the notion that discounting future costs and bene-
fits entails a rejection of intertemporal egalitarianism. As Louis Kap-
low, Dexter Samida and David Weisbach, and Cass Sunstein and Ar-
den Rowell show, an intertemporal egalitarian should endorse dis-
counting so that the choice among projects designed to benefit the
future is not distorted-so that one does not choose a regulatory pro-
ject that transfers wealth to the future less efficiently than saving
does.' Indeed, for the sake of argument, Samida and Weisbach assume
intertemporal egalitarianism in the course of reaching their conclusion
"that discounting by the opportunity cost of capital is generally ap-
propriate and Pareto dominates any other decision procedure."2
However, the actual discount rate used by regulatory agencies
should almost certainly be higher than the opportunity cost of capital.
The latter provides only the ethically appropriate floor for the actual
discount rate that ought to be used by agencies. Indeed, beyond a few
generations the effective discount rate should be infinity-that is, regu-
t Kirkland & Ellis Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Matthew
Adler and David Weisbach for comments.
1 See Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive
Justice and Efficiency, 74 U Chi L Rev 79, 81 (2007) (arguing that intergenerational discounting
"does not depend on the appropriate rate of discount on lives"); Dexter Samida and David A.
Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting, 74 U Chi L Rev 145,146 (2007) ("[D]iscounting
is appropriate, and, in fact, required by any moral theory that accepts the Pareto principle."); Cass
R. Sunstein and Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and Intergenera-
tional Equity, 74 U Chi L Rev 171, 208 (2007) (claiming that "the problem of intergenerational
equity ... should not be conflated with the question of discounting" ).
2 Samida and Weisbach, 74 U Chi L Rev at 152,170 (cited in note 1) (noting that "many of
the discussions of discounting implicitly use this premise" of intergenerational egalitarianism).
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latory agencies should attach no weight to the interests of what I will
call "distant-future generations" even if it would be ethically appropri-
ate to attach equal weight to the interests of these future generations.
How can this be? The answer is that agencies act within a thick
institutional and political environment that bars them from directly
implementing moral precepts-or that would result in perverse out-
comes if agencies did try to directly implement moral precepts. The dis-
count rate that agencies should use is not the theoretically ideal dis-
count rate but the discount rate that generates the best outcomes in a
world in which agencies do not have complete freedom of action.
This argument rests on the basic distinction between moral goals
and decision procedures, a distinction from which all of the authors
under consideration abstract. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that
the government's proper goal is maximization of social welfare, where
the social welfare function includes future generations as well as the
current generation and weights the utility of all individuals equally,
regardless of when they live. It follows from the arguments discussed
by Kaplow and others that the government should use a discount rate
based on the opportunity cost of capital. This ensures that the mar-
ginal utility of individuals will be equalized regardless of when they
live. A benevolent dictator-that is, a government that acts in the
morally perfect way-would do just this.
But the real government is not a benevolent dictator. It is con-
strained by numerous factors, of which I emphasize two. First, because
officials with political power are elected, they must choose policies
that at least roughly please the public or important constituents. They
cannot choose morally ideal policies unless the public seeks morally
ideal outcomes. The "public" here will be taken to consist of people
who have the vote and thus can affect the electoral success of current
government officials. Thus, the public excludes future generations.'
Second, because governance is complex, the government must di-
vide itself into multiple institutions, each of which has jurisdiction over
a different set of problems. In the U.S., regulatory agencies are gener-
3 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L
J 165, 216-19 (1999) (arguing that the distinction "implies that the legitimacy of cost-benefit
analysis is a moral problem and an institutional one"). For a general discussion, see Matthew D.
Adler and Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis 7-8 (Harvard 2006) (argu-
ing that cost-benefit analysis "is not part of the moral bedrock" but instead "is a workable proxy
for something that is part of the moral bedrock-overall welfare").
4 Economists and public policy scholars have generally recognized this constraint. See, for
example, Raymond J. Kopp and Paul R. Portney, Mock Referenda for Intergenerational Deci-
sionmaking, in Paul R. Portney and John P Weyant, eds, Discounting and Intergenerational Eq-
uity 87, 90 (Resources for the Future 1999) (contending that cost-benefit analysis "is attractive
because it is based on the preferences of all those around today").
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ally required to use cost-benefit analysis to evaluate regulatory pro-
jects, but Congress lurks in the background. Agencies have some free-
dom of action because Congress must delegate to them if it wants to
accomplish anything, but they are constrained by congressional as well
as presidential oversight. If agencies attempt to achieve morally per-
fect outcomes that are rejected by the public or that otherwise do not
account for the institutional division of labor, their choices may result
in perverse rather than morally perfect outcomes
Congress and the president will support policies that benefit non-
voting future generations only to the extent that they are supported
by voting members of the current generation. Thus, intertemporal
egalitarianism is possible only if voting members of the current gen-
eration weight the interests of future persons to the same extent as
they weight their own interests. Intertemporal egalitarianism may be
ethically correct, but it is surely false as a matter of human psychology,
and hence people's choices, voting behavior, and electoral politics. If
Americans today value living foreigners at about 1/2000 of an Ameri-
can,6 it seems highly unlikely that they will value future Americans
much more. Indeed, the whole idea that people living six millennia
hence will be anything like us today is extremely odd. Many, if not
most of them, will be descendents of the foreigners whom Americans
today value so little
Thus, it seems clear that even if the ethically correct weight for a
future person is equal to that for a current person, no democratic gov-
ernment would follow this ethical precept. The actual weighting for
generations after three or four is probably in the 1/2000 range. Again,
note the analogy to foreign aid. Democratic governments give much
greater weight to the utilities of citizens than to the utilities of for-
eigners. The most likely reason is that citizens vote; foreigners do not.
If this reason is correct, it applies with equal force to the intertempo-
ral case. Current citizens vote for current elected officials; future citi-
zens do not. Thus, current elected officials who want to be reelected
will try their best to maximize resources for the current generation at
the expense of the well-being of the future, especially the distant future.
5 See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political
Theory Perspective, 68 U Chi L Rev 1137, 1190 (2001) ("[A]gencies that refuse to comply with
laws that reflect [public] concerns will surely be socked with heavy political and legal sanctions.").
6 See Wojciech Kopczuk, Joel Slemrod, and Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Limitations of Decen-
tralized World Redistribution: An Optimal Taxation Approach, 49 European Econ Rev 1051,1075
(2005) (concluding that "the U.S. on average valu[es] the well-being of foreigners only 1/6 as
much as an American citizen, and less than 1/2000 for the residents of the poorest of the devel-
oping economies").
7 See Thomas C. Schelling, Intergenerational Discounting, 23 Energy Policy 395,396 (1995)
(positing that "time may serve as a kind of measure of [cultural] 'distance').
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This is not to say that the current government will treat future
utilities as though they were worth literally zero. Most likely, the cur-
rent government weights future utilities roughly to the extent that
these future utilities enter the utility functions of current citizens. So if
current voters value future generations at 1/2000, then the current
government will value future generations at 1/2000. This is surely why
foreign aid is as generous (or stingy) as it is. Americans care a little
about the well-being of foreigners, and the government responds by
providing a little aid to foreigners. But if the weighting is not literally
zero, it is effectively zero, and thus agencies should ignore future utili-
ties just as they currently ignore the utilities of aliens. 8 I have argued
that agencies should give distant-future generations a weight of zero
because the voting public values them very little. This logic suggests as
well that agencies should give near-future generations-the next gen-
eration and perhaps the generation after-a weight greater than zero
and less than one. I suspect in practice that agencies can give them the
same weight as they give the current generation without creating dis-
tortions, but this depends on empirical and institutional questions that
I cannot address here.
To understand the practical danger from ignoring these con-
straints, imagine that the EPA is given the authority to regulate green-
house gases.9 If the EPA takes into account only the interests of the
current generation of Americans, then the regulations it issues are
likely to be minimal or nil. If the EPA takes into account the interests
of future generations of Americans (or of foreigners, or of both), the
regulations could be quite strict, resulting in an increase in the price of
fossil fuels, automobile travel, and so forth. Consumers would respond
by saving less and spending more at the margin; this will hurt future
generations." Further, consumers will lobby Congress to overturn the
regulation; if they succeed, the EPA's efforts will have been wasted.
Finally, consumers might simply demand additional government pro-
grams that transfer wealth from the future to the present-for exam-
8 This carries the very minor proviso that agencies tend to include, or at least not overtly
ignore, the utilities of aliens on American soil. On the topic of agencies' valuation of foreigners,
see Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U Chi L Rev 537, 579-84 (2005)
(arguing that agencies should value the utilities of aliens commensurately with the value of a
statistical life in the alien's nation).
9 See Massachusetts v EPA, 415 F3d 50, 61-62 (DC Cir 2005) (Tatel dissenting) (arguing
that the Clean Air Act gives the EPA "no discretion to withhold regulation" of greenhouse gas-
es), cert granted, 126 S Ct 2960 (2006).
10 See Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J Pol Econ 1095, 1113-15
(1974) (claiming that individuals adjust their behavior to maintain a constant risk composition of
their private balance sheets); Kaplow, 74 U Chi L Rev at 97 (cited in note 1) (noting that if the
balance of political forces "remains the same, so too would the approximate extent of redistribu-
tion").
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ple, tax cuts without spending cuts and thus increased debt, or energy
projects that degrade the environment in a manner outside the juris-
diction of the EPA, or disinvestment in basic research. Overall, it
seems unlikely that in a democratic society the EPA could effect a
substantial transfer of resources from the present to the future in defi-
ance of public sentiment.
Let me sum up. Suppose that the opportunity cost of capital is 0.3.
Then the discount rate used by agencies should be based on 0.3 for
projects whose effects are felt in the near future (say, thirty or fifty
years out). Beyond thirty or fifty years, the discount rate should be
infinity. A simple way of putting this point is that agencies should ig-
nore the effects, both positive and negative, of their regulations be-
yond fifty or one hundred years. To be sure, this implies that agencies
should approve projects that destroy generations of the distant future
in order to modestly improve the well-being of the present. But there
are no such feasible projects at present, unless one thinks that failure
to engage in greenhouse gas abatement is such a project-and in any
event, and this is my point, this problem of intergenerational equity is
a moral and political problem that agencies cannot resolve outside of,
and prior to, a political resolution by elected officials.
The key to understanding this argument is to recognize that
agencies exercise delegated powers. Implicitly, they are delegated the
power to maximize the welfare of the current generation of Ameri-
cans, not the welfare of all future generations of Americans, and not
the welfare of the current and future population of the world. The
form of cost-benefit analysis that they use must be appropriate for
their delegated power. Indeed, we can again invoke the analogy to
foreigners. Just as agencies have no authority to enact regulations
that enhance the well-being of foreigners, they have no authority to
enact regulations that enhance the well-being of future Americans
independently of the preferences of current Americans. The future is
another country."
11 See L.P. Hartley, The Go-Between 9 (Hamish Hamilton 1956) ("The past is another
country.").
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